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I. CASES
A. Legacy Litigation
1. Louisiana Supreme Court overrules its prior decision in the same
case. The Court now holds that under Act 312, a plaintiff is not
entitled to remediation damages in excess of what is necessary to
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clean up property to regulatory standards, absent an express
contractual provision for a greater clean-up.
The Louisiana Supreme Court issued a decision in an important
“legacy litigation”1 case, State of Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. (“La. Land & Expl. II”), on June 30, 2021.2 This case
has an extensive procedural history, including a prior Louisiana Supreme Court decision issued in 2013 (“La. Land & Expl. I”).3 The June
2021 decision in La. Land & Expl. II overrules the major holding of
the 2013 decision in La. Land & Expl. I.4
This case began in September 2004, when the Vermilion Parish
School Board (“VPSB”) filed a petition in state court against several
oil and gas companies, alleging contamination of certain Section 16
Lands5 that were or had been subject to oil and gas leases granted by
1. The Louisiana Supreme Court explained the meaning of the term “legacy
litigation” in Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 238 n.1 (La. 2010), stating:
“Legacy litigation” refers to hundreds of cases filed by landowners seeking damages from oil and gas exploration companies for alleged environmental damage in the wake of this Court’s decision in Corbello v. Iowa
Production, 02–0826 (La. 2/25/03), 850 So.2d 686. These types of actions are known as “legacy litigation” because they often arise from operations conducted many decades ago, leaving an unwanted “legacy” in
the form of actual or alleged contamination. Loulan Pitre, Jr., “Legacy
Litigation” and Act 312 of 2006, 20 TUL. ENVT. L.J. 347, 348 (Summer
2007).
2. State v. La. Land & Expl., Co., No. 2020-C-00685, 2021 WL 2678913 (La.
June 30, 2021).
3. State v. La. Land & Expl., Co., 110 So. 3d 1038 (La. 2013).
4. La. Land & Expl., Co., 2021 WL 2678913, at *7.
5. For purposes of land surveys and property descriptions, the surface of this
country is divided into numerous “townships,” each of which is divided into 36 “sections,” with each section being 640 acres in size. The individual sections within a
particular township sometimes are referenced by their section numbers, one through
36. Thus, someone might refer to a particular area as being “Section 16.” See Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 290 F.3d 303, 307 (5th
Cir. 2002). In the early 1800s, the federal government took action to support the
establishment of local public schools by donating to Louisiana the Section 16 lands
then owned by the federal government within the State. See id.; see also Vermilion
Parish Sch. Bd. v. ConocoPhillips Co., 83 So. 3d 1234, 1237 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
Louisiana has retained record title to the surface, but has given school boards substantial rights relating to Section 16 lands, including mineral rights associated with
such lands. Id. at 1237–38. Indeed, Louisiana has effectively given school boards
ownership of such mineral rights by giving the boards the right to grant mineral
leases covering Section 16 lands, the right to keep all revenue from such leases, and
the right to bring suit in their own name. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 30:152 (giving to
school boards the right to grant mineral leases for Section 16 lands); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:154 (giving to school boards the right to retain all revenue from mineral leases
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VPSB.6 The petition stated that VPSB was asserting claims for negligence, strict liability, unjust enrichment, trespass, breach of contract,
and violation of Louisiana’s environmental laws.7 VPSB sought damages to cover the costs of remediating the property, as well as for diminution in value of the property, mental anguish, inconvenience,
stigma damages, and punitive damages.8 None of the parties disputed
the fact that although the parties filed suit in 2004 for conduct that
occurred before that, the 2006 version of Act 312 applied to the case.9
The State of Louisiana was not involved in bringing the lawsuit, but
VPSB’s petition purported to bring claims on behalf of both VPSB
and the State of Louisiana, which explains why the caption of the suit
reads “State of Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co.”10
During discovery, the “UNOCAL” defendants (Union Oil Company of California and Union Exploration Partners) admitted responsibility for environmental damage and for funding a cleanup to regulatory standards without admitting liability for VPSB’s other claims.11
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1563 allows for such limited admissions in legacy litigation.12
UNOCAL also filed an exception of liberative prescription, asserting that VPSB’s strict liability claim was time-barred.13 UNOCAL
on Section 16 lands); LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:51 (school boards’ authority to sue).
6. La. Land & Expl., Co., 2021 WL 2678913, at *1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. “Act 312” refers to 2006 La. Acts 312, which was codified at LA. STAT.
ANN. § 30:29.
10. Id. at *2.
11. Id. at *1.
12. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1563(A)(1) (2014) states:
If any party admits liability for environmental damage pursuant to R.S.
30:29, that party may elect to limit this admission of liability for environmental damage to responsibility for implementing the most feasible plan
to evaluate, and if necessary, remediate all or a portion of the contamination that is the subject of the litigation to applicable regulatory standards,
hereinafter referred to as a “limited admission”. A limited admission shall
not be construed as an admission of liability for damages under R.S.
30:29(H), nor shall a limited admission result in a waiver of any rights or
defenses of the admitting party.
13. La. Land & Expl. Co., 2021 WL 2678913, at *2. Liberative prescription—
often called “prescription” for short—is similar to a statute of limitations. See Burge
v. Parish of St. Tammany, 996 F.2d 786, 787 (5th Cir. 1993) (equating “liberative
prescription” and “statute of limitations”). LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3447 (1983)
states: “Liberative prescription is a mode of barring of actions as a result of inaction
for a period of time.”
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noted that a one-year prescriptive period governs strict liability claims
and that VPSB had hired counsel to investigate VPSB’s potential
claim more than a year before filing suit.14 UNOCAL argued that even
if VPSB’s lack of earlier knowledge of the contamination15 delayed
the running of prescription, that prescription would have started running no later than when VPSB hired counsel.16
VPSB argued that the hiring of counsel does not necessarily mean
that a prospective plaintiff knows enough to start the running of prescription.17 VPSB also contended that its claim was immune from prescription.18 Although school boards generally are not immune from
the running of prescription,19 VPSB argued that, because it had named
both itself and the State of Louisiana as plaintiffs, the claims that it
asserted in this case were immune from the running of prescription.20
UNOCAL contended that VPSB lacked authority to bring a legacy litigation claim on behalf of the State and that VPSB cannot shield itself
from prescription simply by purporting to bring a claim on behalf of

14. La. Land & Expl. Co., 2021 WL 2678913, at *3. Civil Code article 3492 sets
a one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions. Torts are delictual actions. See,
e.g., Roberts v. Cardinal Servs., Inc., 266 F.3d 368, 380 (5th Cir. 2001) (tort is a
delict or quasi-delict); Franklin v. Regions Bank, Nos. 16-1152, 17-1047, 2019 WL
3491643, at *3 (W.D. La. July 12, 2019) (Civil Code art. 3492 supplies the prescriptive period for torts.).
15. For claims based on damage to land, prescription begins to run when the
plaintiff acquires, or should have acquired, knowledge of the damage. See LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 3493 (1984) (setting the prescriptive period for claims for damage
to an “immovable”); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 462 (1978) (“Tracts of land,
with their component parts, are immovables.”). For other claims, contra non
valentem brings about the same result—that prescription does not begin to run until
the plaintiff becomes aware, or should have become aware, of the claim. Contra non
valentem, which is short for “contra non valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio,”
is a civil law doctrine that can suspend the running of prescription in certain circumstances, including when a person reasonably lacks knowledge of a claim. Corsey v.
State, 375 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (La. 1979).
16. La. Land & Expl. Co., 2021 WL 2678913, at *3.
17. Id. at *6–7.
18. Id. at *4.
19. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3467 (1983) (Prescription runs against all persons
unless exception is established by legislation.” No legislation makes an exception
for school boards.)
20. La. Land & Expl. Co., 2021 WL 2678913, at *2. Article XII, § 13 of the
Louisiana Constitution provides that the State is generally immune from the running
of prescription. The relevant provision states: “Prescription shall not run against the
state in any civil matter, unless otherwise provided in the constitution or expressly
by law.”
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both itself and the State, when it lacked any authority to sue on behalf
of the State.21
The trial court denied UNOCAL’s prescription exception, and the
case went to a jury trial.22 The jury returned a verdict awarding
$3,500,000 for remediation of the land to a regulatory standard and an
additional $1,500,000 in damages for VPSB’s strict liability claim.23
The jury rejected VPSB’s other claims, including its claim for breach
of contract.24 VPSB sought a new trial, based on a contention that the
jury’s verdict was inconsistent.25 In particular, VPSB argued that it
was inconsistent to award monetary damages for remediation of contamination, but reject VPSB’s claim for breach of contract.26 The trial
court denied the motion for a new trial.27
VPSB and UNOCAL each appealed.28 The Louisiana Third Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling on prescription, holding that
VPSB’s claims were immune from prescription.29 In addition, the
Third Circuit held that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent.30 For that
reason, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial.31 UNOCAL submitted a writ application to the
Louisiana Supreme Court, which granted the application.32
The Louisiana Supreme Court began its analysis of prescription
by noting that the appellate court had held that the School Board’s
claim was immune from prescription, but that UNOCAL contended
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. State v. La. Land & Expl. Co., 302 So. 3d 523 (La. 2020). The author of this
Article filed an amicus brief supporting the application. The amicus brief contended
that the Third Circuit: (1) based its decision on prescription in part on the publictrust doctrine, but the Third Circuit’s rationale was faulty because the public-trust
doctrine does not apply to the prescription issue; (2) based its decision on prescription in part based on a conclusion that Section 16 lands are subject to “public use,”
but this rationale is erroneous because Section 16 Lands are not subject to “public
use”; (3) erroneously treated the question of whether UNOCAL had committed a
breach of contract as a matter of law, when the actual issue in dispute was an issue
of fact; and (4) inappropriately relied on UNOCAL’s limited admission in evaluating VPSB’s breach of contract claim.
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that the claim was not immune.33 The Court noted that, because the
face of VPSB’s petition did not show that its claim was prescribed,
UNOCAL had the burden of proving its exception of prescription.34
The running of prescription would commence when VPSB acquired
or should have acquired knowledge of its injury.35 Thus, UNOCAL
needed to prove that VPSB had actual or constructive knowledge of
its injury at least a year before filing suit.
In attempting to meet its burden, UNOCAL offered evidence that
VPSB had hired an attorney to represent it more than a year before
filing suit.36 UNOCAL argued that Louisiana jurisprudence establishes that, when a plaintiff knows enough to hire an attorney, that
party knows enough to start the running of prescription.37 The Court
disagreed.38 The Court stated that a party’s hiring of an attorney is evidence, within an entire evidentiary record, which a trial court considers when making a factual determination of when a party had actual or
constructive knowledge of their injury.39 The minutes of a VPSB
meeting showed that the VPSB went into executive session to discuss
“potential litigation” and that VPSB authorized the hiring of counsel
during the same meeting.40 The Court stated, however, the decision to
hire counsel and investigate the possibility of injury does not necessarily indicate that a party has actual or constructive knowledge of an
injury.41 Further, a trial court’s factual findings are reviewed under a
manifest error standard.42 Here, concluded the Court, the record did
not indicate that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in concluding
that VPSB’s claim had not prescribed.43 Accordingly, without reaching the issue of whether VPSB’s claim was immune from prescription,
the Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling rejecting UNOCAL’s prescription exception.44

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

La. Land & Expl. Co., 2021 WL 2678913, at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Court then turned to the issue of whether the jury’s verdict
was inconsistent, as VPSB contended.45 VPSB asserted that the verdict was inconsistent because the jury had found that the land contained environmental damage for which UNOCAL was liable, but the
jury verdict concluded that UNOCAL had not breached its lease by
causing more than the normal wear and tear to the property.46 In contrast, UNOCAL contended that the verdict was not inconsistent.47
UNOCAL and at least one amici asserted that it is possible for contamination to exceed current regulatory standards, thus triggering liability under Act 312, without the contamination necessarily constituting more than the wear and tear that would be expected under the oil
and gas lease standards that existed several years ago, at the time the
property allegedly became contaminated.48 The Third Circuit had
agreed with VPSB and thus had held that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent.49
The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that the jury’s verdict
was not inconsistent, given the instructions issued to the jury, but that
the instructions were flawed.50 The Court itself took the blame for this,
stating that the erroneous instructions were made “in light of this
Court’s 2013 La. Land & Expl I. decision, which we now see with
clarity, was made in error.”51
One of the issues in La. Land & Expl. I was the extent to which a
plaintiff in a legacy litigation case can receive contamination damages
in excess of what is needed to remediate the land to regulatory standards.52 No one disputes that plaintiffs can recover a monetary judgment for the damages (if any) other than damage to the land itself
caused by contamination—e.g., any personal injury caused by the contamination.53 Further, no one disputes the proposition that if an express
contractual provision between the parties authorizes a clean-up to a
condition better than regulatory standards, the plaintiff can recover
45. Id.
46. Id. at *5.
47. Id. at *4.
48. Id. at *5.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. at *6 (LA. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(H) (2006) (amended 2014) does not
prevent a plaintiff from pursuing “a judicial award,” such as a money judgment, “for
private claims” other than damage to land).
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that.54 However, the defendants argued that the amount that plaintiffs
can recover for damages to the land cannot exceed what is needed to
fund a remediation to regulatory standards, absent an express contractual provision.55
The defendants based their argument in part on Act 312. Act 312
requires that when a party is found liable for environmental damages,
the party must deposit the payments they make for remediation of environmental damage into the registry of the court to fund a remediation
to regulatory standards.56 If the funds deposited prove inadequate to
complete a remediation to regulatory standards, the district court may
require that the party cast in judgment be required to deposit additional
funds.57 If money is left over after a remediation is complete, the excess is returned to the defendant.58 The version of Act 312 that applied
in La. Land & Expl. I also addressed the possibility of awarding additional damages for damage to the land. In particular, paragraph “H”
stated Act 312 would not “preclude a judgment ordering damages for
or implementation of additional remediation in excess of [regulatory
standards] as may be required in accordance with the terms of an express contractual provision.”59 The defendants contended that, taken
together, these provisions mean that a plaintiff cannot receive a judgment for remediating a property to a condition cleaner than regulatory
standards unless a contractual provision expressly required remediation to a condition cleaner than regulatory standards.60
In La. Land & Expl. I, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that this
did not preclude an award sufficient to remediate the land to a higher
standard, even in the absence of an express contractual provision supporting such an award, if a factfinder concluded that a remediation to
a higher standard was necessary to make a plaintiff whole.61 Further,
the portion of any monetary judgment exceeding the amount needed

54. See id. (quoting LA. STAT. ANN. § 30.29(H) (2006) (amended 2014)).
55. Id. at *5.
56. See id. at *6 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(D)(1) (2006) (amended
2014)).
57. Id. (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(D)(4) (2006) (amended 2014)).
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(H) (2006) (amended 2014)).
60. Id.
61. See id. at *5.
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to fund a remediation to regulatory standards need not be deposited
into the registry of the court and need not be used for remediation.62
In its June 2021 decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded
that La. Land & Expl. I was erroneously decided and that the version
of Act 312 that governs this case does, in fact, preclude such “excess”
remediation damages.63 The 2006 version of the statute stated in part:
B. (1) If at any time during the proceeding a party admits
liability for environmental damage . . . the court shall order
the party or parties who admit responsibility . . . to develop a
plan or submittal for the evaluation or remediation to applicable standards of the contamination that resulted in the environmental damage.
***
C. (5) . . . The court shall enter a judgment adopting a plan
with written reasons assigned. Upon adoption of a plan, the
court shall order the party or parties admitting responsibility
or the party or parties found legally responsible by the court
to fund the implementation of the plan.
D. (1) . . . all damages or payments in any civil action, including interest thereon, awarded for the evaluation or remediation of environmental damage shall be paid exclusively
into the registry of the court in an interest-bearing account
with the interest accruing to the account for clean up.
***
D. (3) The court shall issue such orders as may be necessary
to ensure that any such funds are actually expended in a
manner consistent with the adopted plan for the evaluation
or remediation of the environmental damage for which the
award or payment is made.
D. (4) *** If the court finds the amount of the initial deposit
insufficient to complete the evaluation or remediation, the
court shall, on the motion of any party or on its own motion,
order the party or parties admitting responsibility or found
legally responsible by the court to deposit additional funds
into the registry of the court. Upon completion of the evaluation or remediation, the court shall order any funds remaining in the registry of the court to be returned to the depositor.
***
***
H. This Section shall not . . . preclude a judgment ordering
damages for or implementation of additional remediation in
excess of the requirements of the plan adopted by the court
pursuant to this Section as may be required in accordance
with the terms of an express contractual provision. Any
62. See id. at *6 (quoting LA. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(H) (2006) (amended 2014)).
63. Id. at *5, *7.
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award granted in connection with the judgment for additional remediation is not required to be paid into the registry
of the court. ***64
The Supreme Court stated that the 2013 holding constituted “palpable error.”65 Further, because the trial court issued jury instructions
that attempted to comply with the Supreme Court’s 2013 holding, it
led to reversible error.66 Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded
for a new trial.
Notably, after La. Land & Expl. I, the Louisiana Legislature
amended Act 312.67 The current version of Louisiana Revised Statute
30:29 states in part:
M. (1) In an action governed by the provisions of this Section, damages may be awarded only for the following:
(a) The cost of funding the feasible plan adopted by
the court.
(b) The cost of additional remediation only if required
by an express contractual provision providing for remediation to original condition or to some other specific remediation standard.
(c) The cost of evaluating, correcting or repairing environmental damage upon a showing that such damage was caused by unreasonable or excessive operations based on rules, regulations, lease terms and
implied lease obligations arising by operation of law,
or standards applicable at the time of the activity complained of, provided that such damage is not duplicative of damages awarded under Paragraphs (1) or (2)
of this Subsection.
(d) The cost of nonremediation damages.68
(2) The provisions of this Subsection shall not be construed
to alter the traditional burden of proof or to imply the existence or extent of damages in any action, nor shall it affect an
award of reasonable attorney fees or costs under this Section.69
The Louisiana Supreme Court implied that this new language clarifies
the statute to ensure that the amended version is read the way the Court
now interprets the 2006 version. Specifically, the Court stated: “We

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at *6 (quoting LA. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(H) (2006) (amended 2014)).
Id. at *5.
See id. at *7–8.
LA. STAT. ANN § 30:29 (2014).
§ 30.29(M)(1)(d).
§ 30.29(M)(2).
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also note the Legislature cured this Court’s error by amendment in
2014 to La. R.S. 30:29(M) (2014).”70
The decision noted above represents perhaps the most significant
Louisiana oil and gas decision in 2021. It should be noted, however,
that the Louisiana Supreme Court has granted a rehearing in the case71
with an oral argument scheduled in 2022. The Court’s decision on rehearing will be one of the major Louisiana oil and gas decisions of
2022.
2. Former land and servitude owners could not assign rights under
leases that terminated prior to assignment.
In 1959, the “Hoffman Heirs” granted a mineral lease covering
approximately 343 acres, as well as a surface lease covering five of
the same acres, to a predecessor-in-interest of Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
(“Chevron”).72 In addition, Shell Pipeline Company L.P. operated a
pipeline that crossed the property.73
Chevron’s surface lease expired in 1962.74 In 2005, the Hoffman
Heirs sold the land covered by the mineral lease to Lexington Land
Development, L.L.C.75 In the act of sale, the Hoffman Heirs reserved
a mineral servitude.76
Prior to the sale, Lexington retained an environmental consultant
to perform a “Phase I Environmental Site Assessment”—a type of assessment that involves observation of the property and research regarding current and past uses of the property, but does not involve
taking and analyzing any samples of soil or water.77 In its 2005 report,
the consultant identified numerous conditions of “environmental concern,” including areas where the soil was stained and where vegetation
was sparse or distressed.78

70. La. Land & Expl. Co., 2021 WL 2678913, at *5.
71. State v. La. Land & Expl. Co., 326 So. 3d 257 (La. 2021).
72. Lexington Land Dev., LLC v. Chevron Pipeline Co., 327 So. 3d 8, 13 (La.
Ct. App. 2021). In 1963, Chevron released its rights as to portions of the leased area.
In 1990, Chevron assigned the mineral lease to Stone Petroleum, which assigned the
lease to Robert L. Zinn.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 14.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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To further address the environmental concerns, the consultant
recommended that they conduct a Phase II Environmental Site Assessment, which would involve taking and analyzing samples.79 Lexington
agreed to this recommendation, and the consultant performed the
Phase II investigation. In its written report for the Phase II investigation, the consultant reported that it had found the presence of some
chemicals at concentrations above regulatory standards.80
Lexington proceeded with its purchase of the land in 2005, pursuant to an act of sale that included certain disclaimers regarding environmental conditions.81
In early 2007, Lexington learned that Shell’s pipeline on the property had ruptured.82 In late 2007, Lexington sued Shell for damages.83
In the same suit, Lexington sued Chevron and the subsequent assignees of Chevron’s mineral lease for alleged contamination resulting
from their oil and gas operations.84
By 2011, the mineral lease had terminated.85 In 2012 and 2013,
the Hoffman Heirs assigned their rights in tort, property, contract, and
mineral law as servitude owners and former landowners to Lexington.86
In 2013, Lexington “filed a fifth supplemental and amending petition” to assert both its own claims and the claims that it had obtained
via assignment from the Hoffman Heirs.87
Chevron filed prescription exceptions and motions for partial
summary judgment.88 Eventually, in response to those filings, the trial
court dismissed all of Lexington’s claims against Chevron.89 Lexington appealed.
The Louisiana First Circuit affirmed. It concluded that the Hoffman Heirs could not assign their rights under expired mineral leases.90
The First Circuit seems to have applied this non-assignability rule
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15–16.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 27.
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even as to personal rights, such as causes of action, that arise from
mineral leases. Therefore, because the mineral lease had terminated
before the Hoffman Heirs assigned rights to Lexington, the Hoffman
Heirs had not made a valid assignment of any rights arising under the
mineral lease, whether for pre-purchase or post-purchase contamination.91 Further, under the subsequent purchaser rule,92 any claims that
the Hoffman Heirs might have to recover for contamination damages
would not automatically transfer to Lexington with the purchase of the
land.93
The First Circuit did not seem to expressly address the viability
of any tort claim against Chevron that the Hoffman Heirs may have
assigned to Lexington. The First Circuit concluded that Lexington had
sufficient knowledge in 2005 to trigger the start of prescription against
Lexington as to pre-purchase damages. It is not clear from the appellate court’s opinion how much time passed between any assignment
of the Hoffman Heirs’ tort claims to Lexington. Perhaps more than a
year passed. Alternatively, perhaps the First Circuit believed that the
Hoffman Heirs likewise had sufficient knowledge at the time of sale
so that prescription had begun running as of 2005 (or earlier) against
the Hoffman Heirs.

91. Id.
92. In Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Co., the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that, if a person purchases land that is contaminated, any tort claim based
on that contamination belongs to the person who owned the land at the time that the
contamination occurred. 79 So. 3d 246 (La. 2011). The tort claim does not belong
to the subsequent purchaser, even if the contamination was not apparent or known
at the time of sale, though the subsequent purchaser might have a redhibition claim
against the seller. Id. In Eagle Pipe, the Louisiana Supreme Court expressly noted
that it was not deciding whether the subsequent purchaser rule would apply as to
claims arising under the Mineral Code. Id. at 281 n.80. The Louisiana Supreme
Court still has not resolved that issue, but state appellate courts and federal courts
have concluded that the subsequent purchaser rule would apply to claims arising
under the Mineral Code. For example, in this case, the court clearly believed that the
subsequent purchaser doctrine would apply as to claims brought against a mineral
lessee or former mineral lessee for alleged damages caused during operations conducted pursuant to the lease. See also Glob. Mktg. Sols., LLC v. Blue Mill Farms,
Inc., 153 So. 3d 1209 (La. Ct. App. 2014); Grace Ranch, LLC v. BP Am. Prod. Co.,
252 So. 3d 546 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 2018); Guilbeau v. 2 H, Inc., 854 F.3d 310, 314
(5th Cir. 2017).
93. Lexington Land Dev., LLC, 327 So. 3d at 28.

2022]

LOUISIANA

289

B. Where an operator drilled a well that it intended to be a unit well,
and which later was designated as a unit well, the operation
constituted a unit operation even though the well had not yet
been designated as a unit well. Therefore, the landowner of the
unit did not have a subsurface trespass claim based on wellbore
passing beneath its land.
The plaintiffs sued Range Louisiana Operating, LLC and its drill
site supervisor (collectively, “Range”), asserting that Range committed a subsurface trespass by drilling a horizontal well that intruded into
the subsurface of the plaintiffs’ land in Jackson Parish.94
The undisputed facts showed that Range obtained a permit from
the Louisiana Office of Conservation to drill a lease well to the L-Gray
Sand, a formation that is not pooled or unitized.95 Range commenced
drilling from a surface location on land owned by Tri-Delta Timber
Group, LLC, where Range had a right to operate.96 Range drilled to a
total vertical depth of 14,243 feet, which is within the Lower Cotton
Valley Formation, Reservoir A (sometimes designated as “LCV
RA”).97 This formation is shallower than the L-Gray Sand.98
After reaching that total vertical depth, Range turned the drill bit
and proceeded to drill in a horizontal direction for nearly 5,000 feet.99
The last 1,443 feet of the resulting horizontal lateral was beneath the
plaintiffs’ land.100 The Office of Conservation previously had created
drilling units for the LCV RA.101 The portion of the horizontal lateral
located beneath the plaintiffs’ land was located within one of the preexisting LCV RA units.102 The remainder of the horizontal lateral was
within a separate LCV RA unit.103
Range completed the well on January 10, 2018.104 The plaintiffs
filed suit two days later.105 On February 28, 2018, Range applied to
94. Diamond McCattle Co. v. Range La. Operating, 316 So. 3d 603, 606 (La. Ct.
App. 2021).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 610.
99. Id. at 606.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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the Office of Conservation to amend its permit to designate its well as
a unit well.106 The Office of Conservation later issued an order designating the well as a unit well for each of the two units that included
portions of the well’s horizontal lateral.107 The order was effective on
March 27, 2018.108
In the plaintiffs’ trespass lawsuit, both sides filed motions for
summary judgment.109 Range submitted an expert witness affidavit
stating that it is an accepted practice for the Office of Conservation to
issue a permit that authorizes an operator to drill to a deep, non-unitized formation, even though the operator’s main objective is to test a
shallower, unitized formation.110 Another witness testified via affidavit that it is common practice to designate a well as a lease well so that
an operator can obtain a permit and begin drilling without waiting for
the hearing that would designate the well as a cross-unit well.111 Range
also submitted affidavit evidence that its intent all along was to drill a
unit well to the LCV RA Formation, rather than a lease well to the LGray Sand.112
The state district court in Jackson Parish granted summary judgment in favor of Range, relying on the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
1986 decision in Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas, Inc.113 In Nunez, the
Court held that the creation of a drilling unit alters property rights in
such a manner that a unit operator is not liable for subsurface trespass
if a unit well intrudes into the subsurface of unleased land that is located within the unit.114
The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision to the Louisiana Second Circuit.115 The plaintiffs noted that Range did not have a
lease to operate on their land.116 Further, at the time Range drilled and
completed its well, the well had not been designated as a unit well for
the LCV RA Formation.117 Instead, the Office of Conservation
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 607–08.
Id. at 607.
Id. at 608–09.
Id. at 607.
Id. at 609.
Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955, 964 (La. 1986).
Diamond McCattle Co., 316 So. 3d at 609.
Id. at 607.
Id. at 608.
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permitted the well as a lease well for the deeper L-Gray Sand.118 Indeed, Range had not even applied to amend its permit at the time it
drilled and completed the well.119
The Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments.120 The appellate court cited Nunez v. Wainoco for the proposition that the intent
of the operator controls whether an operation is a unit operation or a
lease operation, and that an operation can constitute a unit operation
even if the drilling permit identifies the well as a lease well.121 The
Second Circuit also noted that the undisputed evidence showed that
Range’s intent all along was to drill to the LCV RA unit.122 Therefore,
the drilling constituted a unit operation even though the well had not
yet been designated as a unit well.123
C. Factual dispute precluded summary judgment on a claim that the
holder of a pipeline servitude breached an agreement by failing
to maintain the canal used to service the pipeline, thereby
allowing the canal to erode to too great a width.
The plaintiff is a Plaquemines Parish landowner whose predecessors-in-interest granted four pipeline servitudes to four pipeline company defendants’ predecessors-in-interest during the 1950s and
1960s.124 The servitude agreements each contained provisions that expressly authorized the servitude holders to construct navigable canals
needed for the operation of the pipelines.125 The agreements also expressly imposed certain duties for the servitude holder to construct and
maintain bulkheads and plugs on the canals.126
The landowner filed suit in state court in 2018, alleging that the
defendants failed to maintain the canals, which allowed the canals to
widen and cause erosion.127 The landowner sought a summary judgment that the defendants had a duty to maintain the canals in a way
118. Id. at 606, 609.
119. Id. at 606.
120. Id. at 611.
121. Id. at 610. See also Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas, Inc., 488 So. 2d 955, 964
n.28 (La. 1986).
122. Diamond McCattle Co., 316 So. 3d at 610.
123. Id.
124. Morgan City Land and Fur Co. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 319 So. 3d 437,
441 (La. Ct. App. 2021).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 442.
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that would prevent erosion.128 The defendants sought a summary judgment that they owe no duty to maintain the width of the canals.129 The
district court held that the defendants had a duty to maintain any bulkheads and plugs as required by the servitude agreements, but that the
defendants otherwise did not have a duty to maintain the width of the
canals.130 The landowner appealed.131
The Louisiana Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that
the defendants have a duty to maintain any required bulkheads and
plugs.132 However, the appellate court disagreed with the trial court’s
conclusion that the defendants have no duty to maintain the width of
the canals. Citing cases and secondary authority,133 the Fourth Circuit
stated that, in exercising their servitude rights, the defendants have a
duty to “not to aggravate [the] servient estate.”134 However, whether
allowing erosion beyond a particular point constitutes “aggravation”
is a fact question.135 Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the portion of the summary judgment that stated that the defendants had no
duty to maintain the width of the canals, but the court did not grant
summary judgment for the landowner on that question.136
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted supervisory writs.137 The
Court stated that the appellate court had correctly held that factual
questions precluded a grant of summary judgment.138 However, given
that the existence or non-existence of a duty is intertwined with the
underlying facts, the appellate court should not have reached the question of whether the defendant had an implied duty. Accordingly, the
Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the denial of summary judgment,
vacated the portion of the appellate court’s opinion stating that the defendant had an implied duty, and remanded the case to the district
court for further proceedings.139
128. Id. at 443.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 451.
133. See, e.g., id. at 449.
134. Id. at 451.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Morgan City Land & Fur Co. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 325 So. 3d 1051,
1052 (La. 2021).
138. Id. at 1052.
139. Id.
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D. Because the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act provides only in rem
remedy, the plaintiff did not have viable LOWLA claims against
a company that no longer held any oil and gas leases where the
plaintiff had performed work.
Grand Isle Shipyards, Inc. filed multiple petitions in state court
against Black Elk Energy Offshore Operations, LLC (“BEEOO”), asserting claims under the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act (“LOWLA”).140
The cases were removed to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana.141 BEEOO abandoned or transferred all
of its leases associated with the work performed by Grand Isle.142
BEEOO moved to dismiss the LOWLA claims.143 The court granted
the motion, noting that LOWLA claims are strictly in rem.144 Thus,
although Grand Isle might have breach of contract claims against
BEEOO, it would not have any LOWLA claims.145
E. Defendant moved for the court to dismiss the plaintiff’s Well Cost
Reporting Act claim on the basis that the plaintiff’s request for
information on the well did not identify the plaintiff’s land. The
court denied the motion, noting that the plaintiff had identified
the unit involved. The court concluded this was sufficient for the
plaintiff to state a claim.
Limekiln Development, Inc. (“Limekiln”) filed suit against XTO
Energy Inc. (“XTO”) in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.146 Limekiln alleged that it is an unleased
owner of a mineral interest in a unit operated by XTO, and Limekiln
sought a judgment recognizing that, pursuant to Louisiana Revised
Statute 30:103.2 of the Well Cost Reporting Statute, XTO had

140. Grand Isle Shipyards, Inc. v. Black Elk Energy Offshore Operations, LLC,
No. CV 15-129, 2021 WL 536292, at *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 12, 2021). The Louisiana
Oil Well Lien Act is found at LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4861–4873.
141. Grand Isle Shipyards, Inc., 2021 WL 536292, at *1
142. Id. at *1.
143. Id. at *2.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *3.
146. Limekiln Dev., Inc. v. XTO Energy Inc., No. 1:20-CV-00145, 2021 WL
956079, at *1 (W.D. La. Feb. 5, 2021). For subject matter jurisdiction, Limekiln
relied on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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forfeited its rights to recover well costs from Limekiln.147 XTO filed
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.148
1. Background—Limekiln’s Property and XTO’s Drilling
Limekiln owns the South Half of the Northwest Quarter of Section 15, Township 10 North, Range 10 West, in Natchitoches Parish.149 Its mineral interest is unleased and not subject to a mineral servitude.150
The Louisiana Office of Conservation created a Haynesville
Shale drilling and production unit that encompassed Section 15, including the entirety of Limekiln’s property, and named XTO as the
operator.151 XTO drilled a Haynesville Shale well that produced for
about two years during the period 2012 to 2014.152 The Office of Conservation also created a drilling and production unit for the Hosston
Zone that included Section 15, and thus the entirety of Limekiln’s
property, and named XTO as the operator.153 XTO recompleted its
Haynesville Shale well in the Hosston formation, and it became the
unit well for the Hosston unit.154
2. Louisiana’s Well Cost Reporting Statute
Louisiana’s Well Cost Reporting Statute consists of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 30:103.1 and 30:103.2.155 Revised Statute 30:103.1
provides that, for each drilling and production unit created by the Office of Conservation, the operator shall provide, “by a sworn, detailed,
itemized statement,” an initial report on the costs of drilling, completing, and equipping a well; then quarterly reports on the ongoing costs
of operating the well and on the well; and then quarterly reports on the
quantity of production and the price received on the sales of production to each owner of an unleased mineral interest who send a request
for such reports by certified mail.156
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Limekiln Dev., Inc., 2021 WL 956079, at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3; see also LA. STAT. ANN. 30:103.1–103.2.
§ 30:103.1.
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Louisiana Revised Statute 30:103.2 provides that if the operator
who receives such a request by certified mail fails to send the required
reports within specified time periods, the unleased owner who requested the reports may send written notice of such failure to the operator by certified mail.157 If the operator still fails to send the required
report within 30 days of receiving this notice, the operator forfeits its
right to demand that the unleased owner pays its share of costs for the
well.158
3. Limekiln’s Correspondence with XTO and this Litigation
On August 13, 2019, Limekiln sent an email to XTO, requesting
information on well costs.159 The email identified Limekiln as the
owner of “90 acres in the South Half of the Northwest Quarter of Section 15, Township 10 North, Range 10 West, Natchitoches Parish.”160
The next day, XTO responded, requesting that Limekiln send a request
via certified mail.161 The same day as XTO’s email, Limekiln sent a
request for such information via certified mail.162 The request identified the unit well at issue,163 but the request apparently did not provide
a property description for Limekiln’s property.164 The next month,
XTO sent a sworn statement of well costs, but Limekiln did not believe that the sworn statement contained sufficient detail to satisfy the
requirements of Louisiana Revised Statute 30:103.1.165
Limekiln sent an email requesting additional information.166 XTO
responded via email and provided additional information.167 The parties exchanged a series of emails, but Limekiln still was not satisfied
with the information provided by XTO.168 Limekiln sent another letter
157. § 30:103.2.
158. Id.
159. Limekiln Dev., Inc., 2021 WL 956079, at *5–6.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *6.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at *3 (“XTO claims Limekiln’s request for well cost reports did not specify the land Limekiln claimed it owned.”); Id. at *8 (the parties “dispute whether the
unleased owner is required to include a property description in the” request for information).
165. Id. at *6.
166. Id. at *7.
167. Id.
168. Id. at *6–7.
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via certified mail.169 This letter asserted that XTO had failed to comply
with Louisiana Revised Statute 30:103.1.170 The letter also noted the
forfeiture penalties provided by Revised Statute 30:103.2.171 XTO
promptly responded via certified mail, but Limekiln still believed that
the information provided by XTO was insufficient to comply with the
requirements of Revised Statute 30:103.1.172
Limekiln filed suit.173 XTO moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).174 XTO argued that, because Louisiana Revised Statute 30:103.2 is a penalty statute, a party must strictly
comply with Revised Statutes 30:103.1 and 30:103.2 in order to invoke the 30:103.2 penalty.175 XTO asserted that Limekiln had failed
to strictly comply with the statutes because it had not stated why it
believed XTO’s responses were insufficient, and because Limekiln’s
request for information did not identify which property it owned.176
XTO argued that, for these reasons, Limekiln was not entitled to invoke the penalty statute.177
The court rejected XTO’s argument, finding that Limekiln’s allegations were sufficient to state a claim.178 Therefore, the court denied
XTO’s motion to dismiss.179 The court distinguished a prior case on
which XTO relied.180 In that case, the person who requested information pursuant to Revised Statute 30:103.1 had neither identified her
property nor stated the unit in which her property was located.181 Although the Well Cost Reporting statute does not expressly require the
unleased owner to identify her property or the unit in which the property is located, the court in that case reasoned that it would be unreasonable to consider a request for information complete unless the request identified the property or unit at issue.182

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at *7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *4, *7.
Id. at *3, *7–8.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In this case, although the request that Limekiln had sent via certified mail had not identified Limekiln’s property, the request had identified the unit in which the property was located.183 Magistrate Judge
Joseph H.L. Perez-Montes, to whom XTO’s motion to dismiss had
been referred by the district court judge, concluded that this was sufficient.184 For this reason, he issued a report that recommended that
the court deny the motion to dismiss.185
II. LEGISLATION–NATURAL GAS PIPELINES MADE SUBJECT TO THE
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INFORMATION DEVELOPMENT,
PREPAREDNESS, AND RESPONSE ACT (AKA THE “RIGHT-TOKNOW” LAW) BY LA ACTS 2021, NO. 246
Acts 2021, No. 246186 amends the Hazardous Materials Information Development, Preparedness, and Response Act,187 also known
as the Right-to-Know Law,188 to provide that the Act, including its
reporting provisions, applies to natural gas pipelines.189
III. REGULATIONS–ADDITIONAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED
FOR OIL STORAGE TANKS
The Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) published revised safety regulations for oil storage tanks in the November
2021 issue of the Louisiana Register.190 The revised regulation is codified in Louisiana Administrative Code 43.XIX.115.191 The regulation
applies to storage tanks that are located less than 500 feet from any
highway or inhabited dwelling or less than 1,000 feet from any school
or church.192 The new requirements mandate that a fence at least four
feet in height must surround the site and that the fencing must contain

183. Miller v. J-W Operating Co., No. 16-0764, 2017 WL 3261113, at *3 (W.D.
La. Feb. 28, 2017).
184. Limekiln Dev., Inc., 2021 WL 956079, at *9.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 2021 La. Acts 549.
188. The Hazardous Materials Information Development, Preparedness, and Response Act is codified at LA. STAT. ANN. § 30:2361–2380.
189. § 30:2361 (1985).
190. The legislation accomplishes this by amending the definition of “Facility,
found at LA. STAT. ANN. § 30:2363.
191. 47 La. Reg. 1647 (Nov. 20, 2021).
192. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX § 115(A)(1)-(B).
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a lockable gate that the operator locks when the site is unmanned.193
The regulation also requires the operator to provide DNR with a means
to unlock the gate.194
The new rules also require that any tank or tank battery be surrounded by a dike, firewall, or retaining wall that has a volumetric
capacity at least as large as the enclosed tanks,195 and that any tank
hatch that is not serving as a pressure relief device be sealed when the
site is unmanned.196 Finally, the operator must prominently display
adjacent to the gate and adjacent to the tank or ladder giving access to
the tank a warning sign that gives notice of danger and flammable contents.197
Operators must implement these safety regulations within three
months of the rule being promulgated.198

193. § 115(C)(1)(b) (2021).
194. Id.
195. § 115(C)(1)(a) (2021). The regulation includes alternative requirements for
areas, such as water, swamp, or marsh, where the construction of such retaining
structures is impossible or impracticable.
196. § 115(C)(1)(c) (2021).
197. § 115(C)(1)(d) (2021).
198. § 115(C)(1)(e) (2021).

